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Abstract. We present an election scheme designed to allow voters to
verify that their vote is accurately included in the tabulation. The scheme
provides a high degree of transparency whilst ensuring the secrecy of
votes. Assurance is derived from close auditing of all the steps of the
vote recording and counting process with minimal dependence on the
system components. Thus, assurance arises from veriﬁcation of the elec-
tion rather than having to place trust in the correct behaviour of com-
ponents of the voting system. The Scheme also seeks to make the voter
interface as familiar as possible.
1 Introduction
Since the dawn of democracy, it has been recognised that the process of record-
ing and counting votes would be the target of attempts at corruption. The An-
cient Greeks investigated the use of (primitive) technological devices to provide
trustworthy voting systems and avoid the need to trust voting oﬃcials, [1]. The
challenge is to provide voters complete conﬁdence that their vote will be accu-
rately recorded and counted whilst at the same time guaranteeing the secrecy of
their vote.
Most traditional approaches to this problem involve placing signiﬁcant trust
in the technology, mechanisms or processes. Thus, for the traditional paper bal-
lot, the handling of the ballot boxes and counting process must be trusted, i.e.,
that the boxes are not lost or manipulated and that the counting process is
accurate. Various observers are introduced to the process which helps to spread
the dependence but does not eliminate it.
With many of the touch screen devices widely used in the recent US pres-
idential elections, the voter at best gets some form of acknowledgement of the
way they cast their vote. After that, they can only trust in the assurances of the
manufacturers and certiﬁers that their vote will be accurately included in the
ﬁnal tally.
By contrast, in [3], Chaum presents a digital voting scheme that enables voter
veriﬁcation, i.e., provides each voter with the means to assure themselves that
their vote has been accurately included in the vote tally. This scheme combines
a number of cryptographic techniques and primitives to provide a high degree
of transparency whilst at the same time preserving ballot secrecy. Rather than
having to place trust in the components to perform correctly, steps of the vote
recording and tallying process are closely monitored to detect any malfunction
or corruption.
The key elements in voter-veriﬁcation are:
– when they cast their vote in a booth, voters get a receipt showing their vote
in encrypted form.
– voters conﬁrm in the booth that her intended vote is correctly encoded in
the receipt. The vote cannot be read subsequently outside the booth.
– a number of tellers perform anonymising mixes and decryption on the batch
of encrypted ballot receipts. The decrypted votes emerge at the end of this
process, with all links between the original receipts and the ﬁnal decrypted
values lost in the multiple mixes. Intermediate steps of the tellers processing
are posted to the web bulletin board.
– random checks are performed on all steps of the process to ensure that, with
high probability, any attempt to corrupt vote capture and counting will be
detected.
The point of the encrypted receipt is to provide the voter with the means to
check that her ballot is entered into the tallying process and, if her receipt has
not been included, to prove this to a third party. The fact that her vote is in
encrypted form ensures that there is no way for her to prove to a third party
which way she voted. Voters can visit the web bulletin board and check that their
(encrypted) ballot receipt has been correctly posted. The tellers process these
posted receipts and there are mechanisms in place to ensure that all posted
receipts are entered into the tallying process.
The anonymising mixes performed by the tellers ensure that there is no link
between the encrypted ballot receipt and the decrypted version that is ﬁnally
output by the tallying process.
The design philosophy is to minimise trust in components. The approach
is to strive for maximal transparency of the whole vote casting, recording and
counting process, consistent with maintaining ballot secrecy. Thus, the integrity
of the ballot forms and the correctness of the tellers transformations are closely
audited. The encryption of the voters choice on the receipt is performed in in
the booth and is transparent and does not depend on the intercession of any
hardware or software devices that might be susceptible to failure or corruption.
2 Preˆt a` Voter
The original scheme of [3] uses visual cryptography to encrypt the receipts and
perform the decryption in the booth. The scheme presented here uses a more
conventional representation of the vote, i.e., ballot forms with the candidates or
voting options listed in one column, and the voter choices entered in an adjacent
column. As a result, the scheme is easier to understand and implement.
An earlier paper, [7], introduced the idea of encoding the vote in terms of
two aligned columns, one carrying the candidate or option list in randomised
order (independent for each ballot form) whilst the other strip carries the voter
choice. In this version, the voter was invited to choose which of the left and right
columns to retain as the receipt. This introduced a certain asymmetry with both
cryptographic and psychological implications.
In this paper we introduce some further innovations: we use ballot forms
that are generated and printed in advance. As before, these have two columns,
one of which shows the candidate list in scrambled order. Now however, rather
than choosing between columns as previously, the voter makes a random choice
between forms. They will always discard the left hand column containing the
candidate list, and submit the right hand column containing the marked vote.
This avoids the asymmetry in the choice between left and right columns of the
previous scheme.
A further innovation is to use the tellers in an oracle mode to enable the
checks on the well-formedness of the ballot forms. This is in addition to the
previous use of the tellers to perform the anonymising mix during the tally-
ing phase. Besides allowing independent auditing authorities to perform random
checks, this also opens up the possibility of novel checking modes, including en-
abling the voters to cast a dummy vote and have the tellers return the decryption
to them as a check on the construction of the ballot forms.
The scheme presented here thus provides a number of appealing innovations,
notably:
– Voters should ﬁnd the vote casting process entirely familiar.
– Cryptographic commitments are generated before voter choices are known.
– Voter checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are supplemented
by random audits. Thus, voters are able to contribute to the veriﬁcation of
the vote capture process but the assurance of the scheme is not dependent
on the voters being suﬃciently diligent.
– Checks on the correct construction of the ballot forms are performed before
votes are cast, thus simplifying the recovery strategies.
– The vote recording devices in the booth do not learn the voters’ choices.
This neatly avoids any threats of such devices leaking the voters’ choices.
– The scheme is conceptually much simpler than others that have been pro-
posed, thus easing of voter acceptance and implementation.
– The current scheme shows considerable ﬂexibility, suggesting that it could
readily be adapted to diﬀerent electoral requirements.
3 The Election Setup
A number of tellers are appointed. Each is assigned or creates two secret/public
key pairs. The use of two keys per teller is a technical convenience arising from
the audit process that will become clear later. These public keys are publicised
and certiﬁed.
An authority creates a large number of ballot forms, signiﬁcantly more than
required for the electorate. These will have a familiar appearance: a left hand
column listing the candidates or options and a right hand column into which the
voter can insert her selection. This might just be an X in one cell for a single
choice election or a ranking for a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. Thus,
for a four candidate race, a typical ballot form might look like:
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
7rJ94K
However, the order in which the candidates are listed will be randomised
for each ballot, that is, far any given ballot, the candidate order shown should
be unpredictable. The random looking value at the bottom of the right hand
column contains the information from which the candidate ordering can be re-
constructed, buried cryptographically under the public keys of the tellers. The
precise construction of the onions will be described in Section 5.2.
The exact details of the voting procedure can be varied according to the na-
ture of the election and according to the perceived nature of threats to which
the system is exposed. For simplicity of presentation we outline one simple pro-
cedure. Other procedures are possible and indeed one of the advantages of this
scheme is that it appears to be signiﬁcantly more ﬂexible than previous variants.
4 An Example
The scheme is best introduced by way of a simple example. We will give a more
formal and general description later. Suppose for simplicity that we are dealing
with a simple election system in which each voter selects exactly one candidate
and the winner will be the candidate who garners the most votes. This allows
us to present the example using simple cyclic shifts of the candidate ordering.
Generalisations to deal with options to select more than one candidate or to
rank them etc. are straightforward and discussed later. Clearly, a “none of the
above” option could also be included.
4.1 Processing votes
Suppose that there are four candidates and these are given a base ordering:
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Buddhist
Since we are considering only cyclic shifts in this example, there are four
possible candidate lists, corresponding to the four possible oﬀsets, 0 to 3, from
the base candidate list. The generation of the random oﬀsets and cryptographic
values will be described in detail later.
For convenience of the mathematical manipulations, we also adopt a canon-
ical numbering convention for the candidates from 0 to 3 as indicated. Thus a
vote for Anarchist will be represented as 0, for Alchemist as 1 etc. This numeri-
cal representation is purely for the machine manipulations and need not trouble
the voter.
Consider the following ballot form:
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Qqkr3c
This has an oﬀset of 1. Thus the onion—Qqkr3c—encodes the value 1. Sup-
pose the system is to process a vote for Nihilist. This would be represented by a
mark in the Nihilist box:
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist X
Qqkr3c
Once the voter has marked their choice, the left hand column that shows the
candidate ordering is detached and destroyed, to leave a ballot receipt of the
form:
X
Qqkr3c
Such right hand strips showing the position of a X and an onion value con-
stitute the ballot receipts.
This is now fed into the voting device, presumably an optical reader, which
transmits the information on the strip, the position of the X (as a numerical
value 0, 1, 2 or 3) and the value of the onion, to the tellers. The tellers use their
secret keys to perform the decryption of the onion (see later), and provide the
decrypted vote value corresponding to the vote in the base ordering. In this case
the process yields the oﬀset 1, so the vote value is the position of the vote (3)
with the appropriate oﬀset removed, yielding candidate 3− 1 = 2: Nihilist. This
process is illustrated in Figure 1. A more detailed description will be provided
later.
Nihilist
Nihilist
Anarchist
Anarchist Alchemist
Alchemist
Buddhist
Buddhist
X
X
Tellers
Qqkr3c
LH strip RH strip processed
RH strip
base ordering
Fig. 1. Processing a vote
4.2 Casting the vote
Our voter, Anne, ﬁrst authenticates herself and registers at the polling station.
She is invited to select, at random, a ballot form. She now enters a booth with
her ballot form and marks her X in the usual way. Suppose that she decides to
vote for the “Buddhist” candidate:
Nihilist
Buddhist X
Anarchist
Alchemist
e1rg38
She now removes the left hand strip (for shredding), and feeds the right hand
strip into the voting device. This checks that the ballot strip is unused and reads
the position of Anne’s X , and the value of the onion. The device marks the strip
as having been used to cast a vote and returns it to Anne for her to retain as
the ballot receipt.
X
e1rg38
Note that the vote recording device does not learn which way Anne voted.
Its role is merely to read the information on Anne’s receipt and relay it to the
the tellers via the web bulletin board. This is a signiﬁcant advantage of this
scheme over many other schemes where the voting device necessarily learns the
voter’s choice, raising the possibility of the device could somehow leaking this
information.
The device transmits its digital record of the receipt to a central server for
subsequent posting to the web bulletin board once the election has closed. Anne
will later be able to visit the bulletin board and conﬁrm that her receipt is cor-
rectly posted and hence that it is correctly entered into the tallying process.
The tallying process is deliberately constructed to hide the link between spe-
ciﬁc ballot receipts and the resulting decrypted votes, in order to provide voter
anonymity. Thus Anne cannot directly link her input vote strip to any speciﬁc
resulting vote, and so she cannot directly verify that her vote has been correctly
decrypted. However, the fact that the votes are all correctly processed can be
checked to a high degree of conﬁdence, provides Anne with the assurance that
her vote will be decrypted correctly.
Observe that Anne’s receipt alone does not reveal which way she voted.
Unless the tellers are involved, this can only be determined if the left hand
strip (now destroyed), that carries the candidate ordering, is aligned against it.
Only the totality of the tellers, acting in consort, using their collection of secret
keys are able to extract the seed information and so reconstruct the candidate
ordering for that ballot form.
5 Construction of the Ballot Forms
The above description should have provided the reader with the key intuitions.
We now give some of the mathematical details.
5.1 Construction of the Cryptographic Seeds and Oﬀsets
For each ballot form, the authority will generate a unique, random seed. Suppose
that there are k tellers (numbered 0 to k − 1), this seed will be made up of a
sequence of 2k values that we will call the germs:
seed := g0, g1, g2 . . . g2k−1
Each of these germs should be drawn from some modest size ﬁeld, perhaps
232. Thus, for k = 3 say, the seed values will then range over 2192. These numbers
can be adjusted to achieve whatever cryptographic strength is required.
The oﬀset for the candidate list is now calculated from these germ values as
follows. First a publicly known cryptographic hash function is applied to each
of the germs and the result taken modulo v, where v is the size of the candidate
list:
di := hash(gi) (mod v) i = 0, 1, 2, ....., 2k − 1
The cyclic oﬀset θ that will be applied to the candidate list on this form is
now computed as the (mod v) sum of these values:
θ :=
∑2k−1
i=0 di(mod v)
g0g1g2g2k−2g2k−1
PKT0
PKT1
PKT2
PKT2k−2
PKT2k−1
D2k D2k−1 D3 D2 D1
D0. . . . . .
Fig. 2. An onion
5.2 Construction of the Onions
In order to facilitate auditing of the tellers whilst preserving anonymity of the
voters (see [3] or [2] for more details), each teller performs two Chaum mixes and,
accordingly, has two independent secret/public key pairs assigned to it. Teller i
will have public keys PKT2i and PKT2i+1 , and corresponding secret keys. The
onion is formed by nested encryption of the germs under these public keys, and
is given by:
{g2k−1, {g2k−2, {. . . , {g1, {g0, D0}PKT0}PKT1 . . .}PKT2k−3}PKT2k−2 }PKT2k−1
We introduce a little more notation to denote the intermediate layers of the
onions. D0 will be a random, nonce-like value, unique to each onion. The further
layers are deﬁned as follows:
Di+1 := {gi, Di}PKTi
Onion := D2k
Where i ranges over {0, 1, ....., 2k − 1}. The construction of an onion is pic-
tured in Figure 2.
6 The Role of the Tellers
The primary role of the tellers is to perform an anonymising mix and decryption
on the batch of encrypted ballot receipts posted to the web bulletin board. This
ensures that the decrypted votes that emerge at the end of mix cannot be linked
back to the encrypted receipts that are input to the process. Aside from some
minor diﬀerences, the role of the tellers and the auditors are essentially as in the
Chaum original. For completeness we give a brief overview here. More detailed
descriptions can be found in [3] or [2].
The ﬁrst, left hand column, of the bulletin board shows the receipts in exactly
the same form as the printed receipts held by the voters. The voters can check
this column to verify that their receipt has been accurately posted. An easy
way to do this would be to search on the string representing the onion value
and check that the X appears in the correct box, i.e., as shown on the voter’s
receipt.
The information in the ﬁrst, left hand column of the bulletin board is then
passed to the ﬁrst teller, Tellerk−1, for processing. There is no shuﬄing of the
information when it is passed to the teller. The position of the X on the voting
slip is encoded as an integer r, and the correctness of this encoding can be simply
and publically veriﬁed.
The tellers will subsequently manipulate the numerical representations of the
receipts, i.e., pairs of the form (ri, Di), where ri is an element of Zv and Di is
an ith level onion. The initial value of r2k is the encoding of the position of the
X as originally placed by Anne on her receipt.
Each column (apart from the ﬁrst, which contains the actual receipts) shows
only the simpliﬁed, digital representation: a pair (r2k, D2k) consisting of a value
r from Zv and the value D of the onion layer.
Each teller accepts an input column of votes (r,D) from the previous teller,
and then carries out two manipulations, to produce a middle column of votes
and an output column of votes. The output column produced by the teller is
then passed to the next teller in the chain.
Thus for each of the (r2i, D2i) pairs in the batch in the input column,
Telleri−1 will:
– apply its ﬁrst secret key, SKT2i−1 to strip oﬀ the outer layer of the onion
D2i to reveal the enclosed germ g2i−1 and the enclosed onion D2i−1.
g2i−1, D2i−1 = {D2i}SKT2i−1
– apply the hash function to the germ value and take the result (mod v) to
recover d2i−1:
d2i−1 = hash(g2i−1) (mod v)
– subtract d2i−1 from r2i (mod v) to obtain a new r value r2i−1:
r2i−1 = r2i − d2i−1 (mod v)
– form the new pair (r2i−1, D2i−1)
Having completed these transformations on all the pairs in the initial batch
as posted in its input column, it applies a secret shuﬄe to the resulting, trans-
formed pairs and posts the resulting (transformed and shuﬄed) pairs to its
middle column on the bulletin board.
TelleriTelleri+1 Telleri−1
Fig. 3. A teller
Teller2 Teller1 Teller0
votesballots
Fig. 4. Three tellers anonymising mix
Telleri−1 now repeats this process on the contents of the middle column
using its second secret key, SKT2i−2 to obtain a new set of (r2i−2, D2i−2) pairs.
It will apply a second secret shuﬄe, independent of the previous one, to this
batch of new pairs. The resulting transformed and shuﬄed (r2i−2, D2i−2) pairs
are now posted to the output column on the bulletin board, and passed on to
the next teller, Telleri−2. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.
This process is repeated by all the tellers in sequence, as illustrated in Figure 4
for a sequence of three tellers. The value of any of the intermediate r values is
thus given by:
r2k−i = r2k −Σij=1d2k−i (mod v)
When the last teller performs the ﬁnal transformation it outputs a batch of
pairs which comprise a ﬁnal r value r0 and the inner onion value D0. The ﬁnal
r0 values are the values of the original votes in the canonical, base ordering.
Figure 5 illustrates the eﬀect of the process on a single vote.
To see this, observe that the candidate list on each form is shifted by the
(mod v) sum of the d values, i.e., θ. Thus the initial r value is the candidate
value plus θ modulo v. For each ballot pair, the tellers will have subtracted out
Teller2 Teller1 Teller0
votesballots
An
An
Al
Al
Ni
Ni
Bu
Bun
X
X
Fig. 5. A vote processed by three tellers
the d values from the initial r value, thus cancelling the original shift of the
candidate list and so recovering the original candidate value. Thus:
r0 = r2k −Σ2kj=1d2k−i (mod v) = r2k − θ (mod v)
Consider the example of Anne’s vote again (illustrated in Figure 5). The form
she used to cast her vote had an oﬀset of 2 and her X was in the second box,
value 1. Hence the initial value of r2k was 1 in her case. The tellers will in eﬀect
compute:
r0 = r2k −
2k∑
j=1
di(mod 4) = 1− 2(mod 4) = 3
Thus the ﬁnal r value r0 = 3 does indeed translate to a vote for “Buddhist”
in the base ordering. The encryption of the vote can thus be thought of as a
(co-variant) transformation of the frame of reference, decryption to the corre-
sponding (contra-variant) transformation.
The overall eﬀect then, is to have posted on the bulletin board, in the left
hand column, the batch of initial receipts as posted by the voting devices. In the
right hand column we will have the fully decrypted votes. In between there will
be a set of columns with the intermediate, partially decrypted (r,D) pairs. Each
column will be some secret permutation of the previous one, and the permutation
will not be published. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that the decryptions at
each mix stage prevent the permutation being reconstructed by simple matching
of onions or r values.
The purpose of using the hash of the germ values buried in the onion layers
to transform the r values is to foil guessing attacks on the mixes. Without
these hashes it would be possible to guess links through the mixes and check
the guess by performing the appropriate computations (with the knowledge of
the teller’s public keys). With the hash functions, these checks would require the
computation of pre-images of the hashes, thus rendering such attacks intractable.
We will see later that, for audited links the tellers are required to reveal not
only the link but also the associated germ. The computations performed by the
auditors are thus perfectly tractable.
Teller1Teller2 Teller0
votesballots
Fig. 6. Information posted by the sequence of three tellers
Assuming that all the tellers perform their transformations correctly, there
will be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of each column and
the next. The exact correspondence, which (r,D) pair in one column corresponds
to which pair in the next column, will be hidden and known only to the teller
who performed the transformation between those columns. Thus, the receipts
will have undergone multiple, secret shuﬄes between the ﬁrst column as posted
by the voting devices and the ﬁnal decrypted column. This ensures that no voter
can be linked to her vote, so ensuring ballot secrecy.
The fact that several tellers are used gives several layers of defence with re-
spect to voter privacy: even if several of the tellers, but not all, are compromised,
the linkage of voters with their votes will remain secret.
The decrypted votes are posted in the ﬁnal column so the overall count can
be veriﬁed by anyone.
7 Auditing the Process
The description so far has assumed that all the steps of the vote casting, record-
ing and counting is performed correctly, to speciﬁcation. In fact, we want to
avoid having to place such trust in the components of the scheme: the authority
that generates the ballot forms, the device that records and transmits the receipt
values and the tellers that perform the mixes and decryptions. In this section
we identify the failure modes and corresponding counter-measures.
We assume for the purposes of this paper that measures are taken to pre-
vent failures of the surrounding system, for example, in the maintenance of the
electoral role, voter authentication etc. These will be addressed in a forthcoming
paper. Here we concentrate on the failure modes of the cryptographic core of the
scheme. With respect to the accuracy requirement there are three failure modes
of the technical core of the scheme:
– Incorrectly constructed ballot forms, i.e., forms for which the cryptographic
seed information buried in the onion does not correspond to the candidate
order printed on the form.
– Incorrect recording of the values on the receipts and/or transmission to the
Web Bulletin Board for tabulation.
– Errors or corruption in the transformations by the tellers on the ballot pairs.
Any of the failure modes could lead to vote values being incorrectly de-
crypted, i.e., resulting in decrypted vote values diﬀerent from those intended by
the voters. We now detail the checking processes that are employed to detect,
with high probability, any such failures. We start with role of The Authority
tasked with generating the ballot forms.
7.1 Checking on the Authority
Suppose then that a suitable authority has generated and distributed a large
number of printed ballot forms to the polling stations. Independent auditors will
be appointed whose task is to subject a random sampling of these ballots to
well-formedness checks. These checks are designed to establish that the seeds
buried cryptographically in the onions correctly correspond to the candidate
list that appears on the form, given the declared public keys of the tellers. The
auditors might also be tasked with checking the quality of the entropy used in
the creation of the ballot forms.
Further random audits could also be performed during the election. Indeed,
once the election has closed, leftover forms could also be routinely audited as
well.
In addition to the checks performed by the auditors, mechanisms can also
be provided to enable the voters to perform checks on the integrity of the ballot
forms of their own, as detailed shortly. Thus, the voters are empowered to con-
tribute to the veriﬁcation of the election. First we describe the auditor checks,
then we describe those that could be made available to the voters.
7.2 Auditing the Ballot Forms
A set of independent auditing authorities are appointed. These should be chosen
in such a way as to minimise the chance of collusion. They might, for example,
be drawn from civil liberties groups, the Electoral Reform Society, the political
parties etc. Each would be invited to make a random sampling of, say, 5% of the
ballot forms generated by The Authority.
To check the construction of the forms, some access to the cryptographic
seeds is required. This could be achieved by requiring the authority to store the
seeds along with their association with the onion values on the forms. However,
the storing and selective release of such crypto material is potentially rather
delicate and fragile. A novel and more elegant and robust approach is to use the
tellers to strip oﬀ the layers of encryption for forms selected for audit and reveal
the seed material.
Once the seed material for a ballot form selected for audit has been revealed,
the form’s integrity can be veriﬁed by recomputing the oﬀset and onion value. If
these match those printed on the form then it is safe to conclude that the form
was indeed correctly constructed. Note that, since the public keys of the tellers
and the crypto hash functions are all public knowledge, these calculations can
be performed and veriﬁed by anyone. More precisely, to check a ballot form, the
following actions are performed:
– the auditor sends a digital copy of the onion on the form is sent to the tellers.
– the tellers strip oﬀ the layers of encryption using their private keys to reveal
the germs.
– the sequence of germ values are returned to the auditor.
– given the germ values, and knowing the public keys of the tellers, the auditors
are able to reconstruct the value of the onion and can check that this agrees
with the value printed on the form.
– they now recompute the oﬀset value as the (mod v) sum of the hashes of
the germs.
– they can now check that the oﬀset applied to the candidate list shown on
the form agrees with the value obtained above.
If these checks are successful, it is safe to conclude that the ballot form in
question was correctly constructed. Checked ballot forms, for which the seed has
been revealed, are then discarded. If a random sampling of a signiﬁcant propor-
tion of forms all pass the checks, then it is safe to conclude that all the forms are
correctly formed. The statistical calculations of the levels of conﬁdence aﬀorded
by such random sampling are straightforward and, of course, the sampling rates
can be adjusted to achieve whatever conﬁdence levels are required.
Note further, that the algorithms for these checks are publicly known, so in
principle, anyone could construct such a checker and make it freely available.
Similarly anyone could examine such a checker to establish that it was perform-
ing correctly. Note also that any interested party could volunteer to perform some
of the auditing. Thus, for example, the Electoral Reform Society could act as
auditors. Representatives of the political parties could act as auditors. Further-
more, any results produced by an auditor can be double checked by independent
parties.
7.3 Voter Checks on Ballot Form Integrity
In addition to the integrity checks performed by the auditors described above,
the scheme also allows for checks on ballot form integrity to be performed by the
voters themselves. This empowers the voters to contribute to the dependability
of the election outcome, a sort of dependability for the people, by the people!.
The technique of using the tellers as an oracle during the voting phase sug-
gests a number of alternative modes for checking the integrity of the ballot forms.
These do not involve the revealing of the seed information.
1. Single dummy vote.
2. Multiple or ranked dummy vote.
3. Given the onion value, the tellers return the candidate ordering.
In the ﬁrst, the voter would cast a dummy vote in exactly the same way that
she will later cast her real vote in the booth, except that in this case the dummy
vote would probably be cast in the presence of voting oﬃcials. Thus, she could
put a cross against a random selection and send the receipt oﬀ to the tellers.
They decrypt the onion and return what they believe was the vote cast. If the
onion was correctly constructed, this should of course agree with the dummy
vote selected.
Psychologically this is an interesting possibility: assuming that the check
succeeds, it should provide the voter with some assurance that when they come
to cast their real vote, it will also be correctly counted. On the other hand it
might undermine their conﬁdence that the secrecy of their vote will be assured.
Such a single dummy vote provides a rather weak check on the ballot form
construction, probing only part of the construction. The second modes seeks to
rectify this: by allowing the voter to cast several dummy votes, either in series
or in parallel by making a ranking selection. In the later case, given the receipt,
the tellers should return what they believe to be the candidate ranking chosen
by the voter. This provides a more complete check on the construction of the
ballot form. Both of these suﬀer the drawback that the voter is expected to make
random choices in the presence of oﬃcials.
The third mode is perhaps the most satisfactory. It provides a complete check
on the ballot form but does not require the voter to make any random selections.
Here, given only the onion value, the tellers should return what they believe to
be the candidate ordering as shown on the ballot form.
We note that, in contrast to the auditor checking mode, these three modes
are vulnerable to collusion attacks. If the authority that generated the forms is
in collusion with one of the tellers there is the possibility of corrupting forms
without detection by these modes. For example, the authority could ﬂip a pair of
candidates on the ballot forms. The colluding teller performs the corresponding
ﬂip during the checking phase, but not during the tallying phase.
The auditor checking mode is not vulnerable to such collusions and so is more
rigorous. It therefore appears to be most suitable for the auditing authorities. It
could also be made available to voters, but it seems less intuitive and so perhaps
less reassuring to the voters. The psychological aspects of these checking modes
from a voter perspective will be investigated in future work.
Thus, a possible voting procedure might be to allow voters when they register
at the polling station to select a pair of ballot forms at random and nominate
one for checking. This could then be checked in the presence of oﬃcials using,
say, the third mode described above. Assuming that the check goes through
okay, the checked form is discarded and Anne can proceed to the booth with her
“real” ballot form. If any check fails, Anne should notify an oﬃcial who should
then investigate and diagnose the source of the error. We will discuss the error
handling and recovery strategies later.
As noted earlier, care has to be taken in assessing the assurance provided by
the voter checks as these are vulnerable to collusion attacks. Various counter-
measures could be adopted to limit the likelihood of such collusions going un-
detected. One possibility is to use an l out of k threshold scheme for the onion
encryptions. The l cardinality subsets of the k tellers could then be chosen ran-
domly for each the dummy voting request. If the colluding tellers were omitted
when a corrupted dummy vote was decrypted, an error would be ﬂagged. In any
case, the random checks by the auditors would catch such manipulated ballot
forms as these are not vulnerable to such collusion attacks.
The tellers might return incorrect germ values but this will of course throw
up a mismatch between the recomputed onion value and the value on the form.
It might be that a teller malfunctions, or is loaded with the wrong keys. In this
case the checks serve a useful role in debugging such conﬁguration errors.
Note that the encryptions are all bijective, hence the germ values are uniquely
determined by the onion value. The tellers cannot therefore ﬁnd alternative germ
values that would give the same onion value but a diﬀerent oﬀset.
Together, these checks ensure that if a malicious or corrupted authority tried
to corrupt votes by providing a candidate ordering that does not correspond
to the seed information buried in the onion, they stand a high chance of being
detected. The chance of corruption going undetected falls oﬀ exponentially with
the number of ballots they try to corrupt.
We stress that all the checks detailed here serve purely to probe the well-
formedness of the ballot forms, i.e., serve to detect any failure of the candidate
orderings on the forms to correspond to the information buried in the onions.
These checks do not provide any detection of corruption during the tallying
phase. A form that is correctly constructed in this sense will correctly capture
the voter’s intention. Of course, this does not of itself ensure that the vote will
ultimately be correctly decrypted. For this we need additional mechanisms to
ensure that all ballot receipts will correctly recorded, transmitted and decrypted.
These we address next.
8 Checking on the vote recording devices
Next, we need to ensure that ballot receipts are faithfully recorded, transmitted
and entered into the tallying process. This is where the web bulletin board comes
into play. Once voting has closed, all ballot receipts are posted to the bulletin
board. The material posted to the bulletin board will be publically available
in read only mode. Thus any voter can visit the board and conﬁrm that their
receipt appears correctly in the input column.
If their receipt does not appear, or appears in corrupted form (in particular,
if the position of the X is incorrect), this should be reported. The voter has
their receipt to prove to an oﬃcial if their receipt does not appear correctly. In
practice all ballot forms would be printed with anti-counterfeiting measures and
would have been stamped and digitally signed by the device in the booth when
the vote was cast to prevent attempts to fake receipts.
Assuming that voters are reasonably diligent in performing these checks,
any failures to faithfully post receipts to the bulletin board, and hence to enter
them into the tallying, should be detected. Precautions would also be needed
to prevent anyone inserting additional, invalid receipts. One simple precaution
would be to ensure that the number of posted receipts matched the number of
cast ballots. The digital signatures applied by the voting devices could also be
used to help prevent fake ballots being introduced.
A further, possible enhancement is for the device in the booth to produce an
further, paper copy of the ballot receipt. This copy is posted into a locked and
sealed audit box (perhaps after being viewed under glass and conﬁrmed by the
voter in the manner of the ‘Mercuri method’ [5]). Now, independent auditors
can perform checks of the correspondence between published receipts and the
paper audit trails stored in the audit boxes. This serves to supplement the checks
performed by the voters on the appearance of their receipt in the published list.
This last enhancement has similarities to the Voter Veriﬁable Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT [5]) and has the advantage that the checks on ballot receipts on the
web bulletin board performed by the voters are supplemented by auditor checks.
The assurance of the scheme is thus less dependent on the diligence of the voters
in checking the appearance of their receipt in the published list.
9 Checking on the Tellers
The checks described above should ensure that voters’ intentions are correctly
encrypted in the ballot receipts and that all receipts are correctly entered in
the tabulation process. Now we must ensure that all the receipts are accurately
decrypted. For this, we must ensure that all the transformations performed on
the receipts by the tellers during the anonymising mixes are correct.
As in the original Chaum scheme, the auditing of the tellers is based on the
notion of partial random checking proposed in [4]. This takes place after the
teller processing has ﬁnished, and is applied to the information committed to by
the tellers on the web bulletin board.
For each teller an auditing authority goes down the middle column and ran-
domly assigns R or L to each (r,D) pair. For pairs assigned an R, the auditor
requires the teller to reveal the outgoing link (to the right) to the corresponding
pair in the next column along with the corresponding germ value. For all pairs
assigned an L, the auditor requires the teller to reveal the incoming link (from
the left) along with the germ value.
This way of selecting links ensures that, for any given teller, no complete
route across the two shuﬄes performed by that teller are revealed by the audit
process. Hence no ballot receipt can be traced across the two mixes performed by
any given teller. Each ballot transformation has a 50/50 chance of being audited.
This is illustrated in Figure 7, with the selected links included. The remaining
links are not revealed.
For each teller the auditor performs such a random audit. Given the property
that there are no full links revealed across any teller’s mixes, the L/R selection
can be made quite independently for each teller. This is the rationale for making
each teller perform two mixes.
Suppose that for a revealed link the pair has been transformed thus:
ri, Di −→ ri−1, Di−1
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Fig. 8. Auditing the three tellers
Knowing this and the corresponding germ value gi−1 (which the teller is
required to provide for each revealed link), it can be checked that the following
hold:
Di = {gi−1, Di−1}PKTi−1
and
ri−1 = ri − hash(gi−1)(mod v)
If these equalities hold on a link we can conclude that the teller executed the
correct transformation on this ballot pair. Some additional reasoning is required
to show that it is not possible for a teller to perform a corrupted mix and be
able to reveal false links in such a way as to pass any audit.
Figure 8 illustrates the audit across the sequence of three tellers.
10 Error Handling and Recovery Strategies
So far we have only described the checks that can be performed. A full description
of the scheme requires detailing error handling and recovery modes. Due to lack
of space we will not attempt to give an exhaustive description here.
Let us just consider the error handling strategy for a failed voter check. The
ﬁrst step for the oﬃcial is to conﬁrm that there is a real disagreement. Anne will
have both parts of the dummy ballot form so she can prove which way she cast
her dummy vote and she has the printout for the tellers. The oﬃcial can thus
establish that the problem is genuine and not just a case of voter error.
If the problem is real, the oﬃcial should now run a further, auditor check: use
the tellers as an oracle to extract the seed value and use this value to reconstruct
the onion value and candidate list oﬀset. If these values agree with those shown on
the ballot, then it is fair to conclude that the form was correctly constructed by
the authority. The error must then lie with the decryption of the vote performed
by the tellers.
If this check fails, it can mean one of two things: the form was incorrectly
constructed by the authority, or the form was perhaps actually correctly formed
but the seed value returned by the tellers is incorrect.
Clearly, errors have to be diagnosed and collated. Strategies for dealing with
patterns of errors must be speciﬁed. Thus, if a signiﬁcant number of ballot forms
were found to be mal-formed, doubt would be cast on the integrity of the au-
thority charged with generating the forms. Note another pleasing feature of the
scheme: any signiﬁcant corruption on the part of the authority generating the
ballot forms would almost certainly be detecting by random audits before the
election opens. Hence, this authority could be replaced before the election even
starts.
A full description of error handling and recovery strategies will be given in a
forthcoming paper.
11 Generalising ballots
This paper has so far considered ballots which allow a vote against a single
candidate. More generally, elections may allow votes or preferences to be cast
against a number of candidates. In this case a right hand strip may contain a
number of X ’s, or perhaps a list of numbers against candidates.
In this case, in order to avoid leaking information about votes, it is necessary
to allow any permutation of the candidate list on the left hand strip, rather than
just a cyclic permutation.
In order to achieve this, the germs could be used as keys for a cryptographic
permutation function. The overall permutation applied to the candidate list
as shown on the ballot form would then be a composition of the 2k separate
permutations obtained from the 2k germs.
We use a publically known hash function h that maps germs to permutations,
so that pi = h(gi) is a permutation of names on ballots. The overall permutation
is given by the composition of the permutations for all the germs:
π = p2k−1 ◦ p2k−1 ◦ . . . ◦ p0
(where f ◦ g(x) = f(g(x))). If the base candidate ordering is base, then the
candidate list on the ballot is given by π(base). Thus a corresponding vote r on
the right hand strip corresponds to a vote of π−1(r) against the base ordering.
The steps in the tellers take (ri+1, Di+1) to (ri, Di), where each step reverses
one permutation comprising π. Here, the r values will encode either a ranking or
an element of the power set of candidates as appropriate. The onion is unpeeled
as previously to extract the associated seed gi and the inner onion Di. In this
case the computation of ri is given by:
ri := (h(gi))−1(ri+1) = p−1i (ri+1)
Given the initial vote r provided to the tellers is the initial vote r2k, we obtain
that
ri = (p−1i ◦ p−1i+1 ◦ . . . ◦ p−12k−1)(r2k)
and thus the ﬁnal vote r0 posted by Teller0 is π−1(r), which is indeed the vote
cast.
12 Related work and conclusions
A large number of cryptographic voting schemes have been proposed over the
past 20 or so years. These use a variety of cryptographic techniques, ranging from
blind signatures to cryptographic homomorphisms etc. The idea of providing
the voter with an encrypted receipt goes back the original scheme proposed by
Chaum. Another scheme, that also uses encrypted receipts and has similar goals,
is the VoteHere scheme of Adler and Neﬀ, [6]. The cryptographic primitives used
there are quite diﬀerent from those of this paper and appear to be signiﬁcantly
more complex.
We have presented a new voter-veriﬁable election scheme based on the orig-
inal Chaum scheme. This variant preserves the essential features of the original
whilst sidestepping the complexity of the visual cryptography of the original.
The presentation of the encoding on the vote is quite intuitive and familiar. A
pleasing spin-oﬀ is that the randomisation of the candidate order counters any
tendency to bias the voter choice that might arise from a ﬁxed order.
The new scheme provides some interesting advantages over previous variants:
– The format of the ballot forms and the process of casting a vote is quite
familiar.
– The cryptographic commitments are generated before the voter choices are
revealed, even before the election period starts.
– The vote recording devices do not learn the voter choices. This avoids the
possibility of such devices leaking this information.
– Voters get to perform their own checks on the correct construction of their
dummy ballot forms. This should help instil conﬁdence that their real votes
will ultimately be correctly decrypted during the tallying process.
– The checking performed by the voters is supplemented by audits performed
by various auditing agencies.
– The problem of storing and selectively revealing seed information is solved
by the novel use of the tellers during the voting period as oracles to reveal
the seeds for ballot forms used for auditing.
– Voters get to run their checks before casting their vote. This avoids some of
the messiness in the recovery mechanisms of earlier variants when a voter
discovers a mal-formed receipt after casting their vote.
– The initial auditing phase performed on the ballot forms forms should serve
to weed out any corrupt authority even before the election opens.
Precautions need to be taken to prevent double voting. In particular, care
needs to be taken to ensure that ballot forms used for checking cannot be reused
to cast real votes. These details of such mechanisms will be discussed in a future
paper.
Similarly, precautions are need to clearly separate the two functions of the
tellers: the on-demand ballot form integrity checking function and the anonymis-
ing mix function. In particular it is essential to ensure that no ballot form that
has has been used to cast a “real” vote can be subsequently used in a check-
ing mode. Various procedures can be envisaged to prevent this: appropriately
marking a receipt that has been used to cast a vote and ensuring that it cannot
be reused for either dummy or real voting. It would be satisfying to develop
cryptographic mechanisms to enforce this.
For the purposes of illustration we have described how the scheme can be
used for a single vote system, i.e., in which voters get to choose just one of a
set of options or candidates. Where voters can rank the candidates in order of
preference (or indeed where they can vote for more than one candidate), full
permutations in place of the simple cyclic shifts presented here. In practice, full
permutations would probably be used even for single selection elections.
13 Future Directions
The destruction of the left hand strips of the ballot forms is essential to prevent
coercion. An issue that requires careful consideration then is how to best enforce
the destruction and ensure that it is not possible for the voter to exit the booth
with both parts of the ballot form. Mechanical devices that enforce the destruc-
tion when the vote is cast are a possibility. Another interesting possibility is,
rather than trying to enforce destruction of this strip, to ensure that plenty of
dummy left hand strips are available in the booth. If a voter is threatened with
coercion they can simply select an appropriate strip that will keep the coercer
happy.
Another issue is that, as presented, the scheme entails the authority know-
ing the association of all onions and candidate lists. Thus, if the authority were
compromised, it could jeopardise the secrecy of the election. Various measures
can be envisaged to counter or at least minimise this risk. Ballot forms could be
generated in some distributed fashion using various sources of entropy. Alterna-
tively, ballot forms could be generated and printed on demand. An intriguing
possibility is to use entropy derived from the paper used to print the forms, for
example using optical ﬁbres stirred into the paper during manufacture. Ballot
forms could be supplied in sealed envelopes to prevent the information being
garnered in transit. The problem remains that there is still a point at which the
onion and candidate list must be presented to the voter.
For the three voter checking modes, the germ values do not have to be re-
vealed. This suggests the possibility of reusing a “dummy” ballot form to cast
a real vote. This has the advantage that the form used for the real vote will
itself have been tested. Ballot forms could come equipped with two onion values,
both of which should yield the candidate ordering shown. One could be used
for checking, the other to cast the real vote. This possibility may however open
up vulnerabilities and would need to be subjected to careful analysis. We will
pursue this in a forthcoming paper.
This scheme would appear to be readily adapted to remote voting. The sim-
plest adoption is to distribute ballot forms by post. Votes could then be cast by
providing the onion value along with suitable indicators of the voter selection
in the right hand column. Alternatively, protocols could be used for on-line, au-
thenticated distribution of the crypto material. Of course, the threat of coercion
that plagues remote voting systems rears its head again, but there may be ways
to oﬀset this.
These avenues are the subject of current research.
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